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T Nobel Prize presentation ceremony recently concluded in Oslo, Norway, and like most others, I only managed to read the first two paragraphs of any article on the achievements 
of these men and women. Being a student of mathematics, and due 
to the absence of a Nobel prize in that field (rumoured to be due to 
a disagreement between Alfred Nobel and mathematician Mittag 
Leffler), I find myself drowning in the technical jargon present 
in all such write ups. I was thus circumspect when I saw a notice 
announcing a talk – requiring no prior knowledge of the subject – 
on the Nobel  Prize winning work of Alvin Roth (Economist) and 
Lloyd Shapley (Mathematician/ Economist). 
Walking into the packed hall, I went to the back of the room 
and seated myself so as to be able to  make a quiet exit in case I 
disagreed with the notice on what “no prior knowledge required” 
meant. In walked our speaker for the day (henceforth referred to 
as Professor), looking pleased at the large turnout. Setting his notes 
down on the table he addressed the crowd of eager faces.
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“As I mentioned in my mail inviting you all here, I 
am not an expert on this subject. In fact, this talk is 
more to celebrate the unprecedented event that I 
actually understood the work of some economists 
and I would like to share my excitement with you. 
Feel free to ask me as many questions as you wish 
and in turn, allow me the freedom to not know the 
answer at times!”
I chuckled quietly to myself, pleased at the 
informal beginning to the proceedings.
“So,” he began again, “today we’re going to discuss 
the work of Roth and Shapley. They were just 
recently awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics 
for their work on the matching problem. The 
basic problem, initially worked on by Shapley 
(along with a mathematician by the name of David 
Gale) is as follows. Suppose you have n  men and 
n women in a room, each man has a list which 
rates each of  the n women according to who 
he likes more and similarly, each woman has a 
corresponding list of men. Suppose a marriage 
consists of pairing up a man and a woman, i.e., 
to each man a unique woman is associated and 
vice versa. For those of you with a mathematics 
background, a bijection (one to one, onto 
correspondence) is set up between the men and 
the women. You are allowed to divorce your 
spouse if you prefer the husband (correspondingly 
wife) of another person to your current partner 
and that person also prefers you to their wife 
(correspondingly husband).” 
He probably sensed our brains furiously trying 
to wrap itself around the idea, because he soon 
picked up a chalk and wrote on the board:
“M1 can divorce W1 only if W2 is higher than 
W1 on his preference list AND W2 prefers him 
to M2. Now, the question is, is there a marriage 
arrangement such that all n men and women are 
matched, and no one wants (or in this case, 
is permitted) a divorce!”
“Such an arrangement IS possible, and not just 
that, there is an algorithm by which you can get 
this ‘stable’ arrangement, but we’ll come to that in 
a moment. Let me first give you a slightly different 
example, and one where a stable arrangement is 
NOT possible. This is the roommate problem.”
“Suppose you have four people A, B, C, and D who 
have to share two rooms (two in each room).  
Again, they all have their own preference lists and 
the conditions by which you can change rooms is 
analogous to the divorce scenario in the previous 
example. Now take these as your preference lists 
and work out that a stable arrangement is not 
possible and tell me what the difference between 
the two examples is.” 
I whipped out my notebook and began to scribble 
furiously on the last page, determined not to lose 
track of things.  
Person Preference 
A B > C > D
B C > A > D
C A > B > D
D C > A > B
I wrote out the various possibilities:
I thought to myself, “In 1), B and C will be better 
suited, in 2), A and B will want to room together 
and in 3), A and C will want to share. So there is 
no stable arrangement! But what is the difference 
between this and the marriage problem?!” 
Possible pairs 
in Room 1






A & B C & D A is happy,  
B prefers C
C prefers B,  
D is happy
A &C B & D
A &D B & C
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“Anyone figured out the difference yet?” asked the 
Professor.  
To my dismay, someone’s hand shot up. “Here 
A can choose from B, C, D whereas in the earlier  
problem, the men can only choose from the 
woman and vice versa. It’s a modern day marriage 
problem sir!” he quipped. 
Happy with the participation of the audience, 
the Professor replied smiling, “That’s right! In 
the Marriage Problem, the men ONLY rank the 
women, and the women can ONLY choose from the 
men, which is not the situation in the roommate 
conundrum! Okay, so now that we’ve established 
that it isn’t a trivial problem that we’re attempting 
to understand, let’s think about this algorithm that 
our economist friends have come up with.”
The chalk reappeared in his hand and he began to 
write again. I fidgeted around, trying to find the 
optimum angle to look at the board from, kicking 
myself for my seating choice. I managed to find a 
position just as he finished his visit to the board.
“Suppose there are 3 men and 3 women, for 
simplicity's sake,” he said, now walking up and 
down the length of the board, all the while looking 
at his audience. “Suppose that each man proposes 
to his favourite lady, and each lady considers 
all the proposals she receives (possibly none), 
scrutinizes them and keeps the one which is 
highest on HER list and rejects the rest. Note that 
she does not say ‘Yes’ to the one she keeps, she 
just tells him ‘you’re in contention, but hold your 
horses, I may change my mind yet’. Now all the 
men who are depressed at the outright rejection 
get another chance, and they propose to their 
second favourite woman, and the same procedure 
repeats itself.”
He paused as if for dramatic effect before 
exclaiming, “This simple technique is the 
algorithm!” 
There was a murmur around the audience as 
everyone spoke to those sitting beside them, 
looking slightly comical. Excited and serious is not 
an expression that the human face has learnt to 
master! 
A faint voice from the back of the room slowly 
piped up… mine. “Sir, I can see that it seems to 
give a stable arrangement (Refer to Box I), but 
how are we guaranteed that this procedure will 
ever end, and even if it does, it need not be unique, 
right?”
“Good question! To answer the first part, take this 
example and try and work it out for yourself and 
see that there is nothing that you have done that is 
specific to this example.
(Answer on Page 30) 
A more detailed yet easily understood explanation 
is available in the American Mathematical Monthly 
where D Gale and L S Shapley published their 
work.”(Refer to Box II.)
Here is my reasoning on why the suggested 
algorithm yields a stable arrangement:
Suppose M (for man) is not married to W (for 
woman) but yet prefers her to his own wife. We 
show that W cannot prefer M to her husband. 
Since M likes W more than his wife, at some point 
during the algorithm, M would have proposed to 
W. Since M and W are not together, that means that 
W rejected M’s proposal in favour of someone she 
liked more! Thus, W must like her current husband 
more than she liked M and hence there is no 
instability in our arrangement!
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 Box II: Why the procedure will end!
“As for your second question, this solution may 
not be unique! Suppose that in some parallel 
universe the women are the ones proposing 
and the men accepting/ rejecting. Then, using 
the same algorithm we’ll get another marriage 
arrangement that might well be different. In fact, if 
you notice, the ‘proposing party’ gets a favourable 
result as opposed to the other! This is because the 
‘proposing party’ is in fact going out there in order 
to look for the best possible deal for them while 
the ‘accepting party’ is waiting to decide from the 
offers they receive! I’m sure there is a life lesson 
here somewhere but I’m not here to lecture on 
philosophy!” 
The room burst into laughter, mostly at the joke, 
but partly to express their happiness at having 
understood the lecture thus far.
“Many years later, Dr Roth (along with a number 
of fellow academics) modified the Gale Shapley 
algorithm in different instances and applied the 
work to a number of areas such as matching 
hospitals and medical students. Just about ten 
years or so back, he was asked to sort out the 
chaotic New York City High School application 
system. As is the case with any great piece of 
work, a number of other people have taken 
up this idea and tried to make it even more 
streamlined. One such case involves the example 
of hospital and medical students. A possible aim 
is to find a system in which if students lie about 
their preferences, it may not yield a solution in 
their favour (Refer to Box III). Another could be 
accommodating for married students wanting 
to be in the same hospital (or town) as their 
respective spouses. It is a case of taking the above 
algorithm and making it more attuned to the 
eccentricities of the real world.” 
I found myself quite excited, not least because 
I finally had somewhat of a tangible answer to 
people asking me what it was I could do after 
learning so much maths. My customary “the world 
is at my feet” sort of answer was getting stale to 
my ears!
“So that was what I wanted to discuss regarding 
‘the marriage problem’. Now, if nobody minds, 
there is another, unrelated but all the same 
interesting topic that I would like to discuss. How 
are we doing on time?”
I glanced at my watch and found that while we 
were trying to play match maker, nearly an hour 
had passed! Expectedly, everyone vociferously 
nodded their assent and we continued. 
“Okay, we now discuss a slightly different 
problem. Suppose you have a particular town, 
and in that town a finite number of schools. Let 
this sheet of paper represent the town,” he says 
holding a colourful sheet; “let the dots from 
which the colours are radiating be the schools, 
and let each point on the sheet be a child. Yes, 
I know that’s unrealistic but just bear with me. 
Each school has a fixed capacity. The question 
now becomes, how does one allocate students 
to schools? The natural idea is to use distance: 
As mathematicians, however, we will never be 
satisfied with a proof just because it seems to 
work in a particular example. On getting back to 
my room after the talk, I looked up the original 
paper by Roth and Shapley in the American 
Mathematical Monthly. The argument is simple. 
First of all, note that eventually (in fact in  
n2– 2n + 2 stages), every girl must have received 
a proposal. 
Suppose some girl hasn’t received a proposal. 
Then, since the number of boys and girls are the 
same, there must be at least one girl who at that 
point has at least two proposals. Thus, she must 
reject all but one and the rejected (and dejected) 
boys must now propose again. Since no boy can 
propose to the same girl more than once, every 
girl MUST receive a proposal sooner or later! And 
once the last girl receives a proposal, the period 
for “courtship” is over and the procedure must 
end and each girl must accept the boy she has on 
her string!
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students who are closer are preferred to those 
further away. You may object and say that a 
student may be equidistant from two schools  
(or vice versa) but this would form what is called 
‘a set of measure zero’.”
I tried to recall my course in measure theory, one 
semester ago suddenly felt like an eternity away.  
“Measure zero essentially means of negligible size, 
like the integers as a subset of real numbers, or, 
for the poetically inclined, the stars in the sky,” I 
remember my teacher saying and quickly brought 
my attention back to the lecture.
“So what’s happening in this picture is, each school 
branches out radially until it fills up its quota, 
and if two school ‘kingdoms’ touch, then neither 
of them moves any further in that direction but 
continue to expand in other directions. Analogous 
to the divorce concept in the previous problem, a 
child X may change schools if there is a school A 
that: 
a. Is closer to him than his present 
establishment, B
b. Has a student Y who is further away from him
Then, much to the displeasure of Y and his 
parents, he will be asked to leave A, and X will be 
enrolled in his place. The question then becomes, 
is there a stable arrangement for this question? 
The answer to this too is Yes, and, anticipating 
your next question, this arrangement will be 
unique! The reason is that, unlike in the marriage 
scenario, here the criteria for the ‘preference 
lists’ is the same for both students and schools! 
So if men and women find a parameter and an 
unambiguous rating system on which everyone 
agrees, then we can find a unique stable 
arrangement that is at the same time the best and 
worst possible for both parties!”
Someone seated in the front row asks, “But sir, 
in this particular diagram, if you notice, there are 
disjointed bits for some colours. Is it possible for 
every colour to be ‘connected’ in some sense?”
“Definitely! This is the next logical question to 
wonder about and that is exactly what researchers 
wondered. I won’t go into the details of this; 
perhaps we can have another seminar sometime 
on this question where we can discuss this 
question at length. On this colourful note I will end 
today’s lecture. I hope you enjoyed yourself. For 
those of you who thought that this was a waste of 
your time, hopefully the samosas and tea outside 
will make it feel a little more worthwhile!”
Spontaneous applause broke out in the room and 
everyone was on his or her respective feet, some 
eager to get their hands on the promised samosa, 
but more in appreciation of a well-delivered and 
more importantly, reasonably well-understood 
lecture – a far from common event in the world of 
academia!
As I stood waiting for my share of the 
refreshments, I heard a remark, “If this Ph D thing 
doesn’t work out, maybe I can use this algorithm 
to open my matrimonial site!” While that, I’m 
quite certain, wasn’t the aim of Messrs. Roth and 
Shapley, I too realised that Maths, or any subject 
for that matter, is far more interesting when 
you look at the problem at hand in a broader 
perspective, rather than being caught up with 
whether the expression in line 23 should have a 
minus sign or not.
(Answer:  M2-W1, M1-W3 and M3-W2 will live 
happily ever after!) Box III
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One particular such “real world eccentricity” is people wanting to subvert the system to obtain results in their favour! That is to say, suppose one man knew 
the preference list of all the others, would changing his own preference list skew the final arrangement in his favour? The answer to this question is far from 
obvious, but it is yes! In fact, Roth proved that there is no stable arrangement for which telling the truth is the best strategy for all parties concerned! Let us 
take the following case as an example to see how one may influence the final arrangement in their favour.
Men True Preference Women True Preference
M1 W1>W2>W3>W4 W1 M4>M3>M2>M1
M2 W1>W3>W2>W4 W2 M4>M1>M3>M2
M3 W1>W2>W4>W3 W3 M1>M2>M4>M3
M4 W3>W4>W2>W1 W4 M2>M1>M4>M3
An easy verification shows that the Gale Shapley Algorithm will now yield the following stable result (under the Women propose scenario):
W2-M4, W3-M1, W4-M2, W1-M3
Now, suppose M4 is not the righteous man we believe him to be and he decides to try to subvert the system. Armed with the knowledge of the preference 
lists, M4 cunningly changes his list to: W3>W4>W1>W2.
Men New Preference Women True (=New) Preference
M1 W1>W2>W3>W4 W1 M4>M3>M2>M1
M2 W1>W3>W2>W4 W2 M4>M1>M3>M2
M3 W1>W2>W4>W3 W3 M1>M2>M4>M3
M4 W3>W4>W1>W2 W4 M2>M1>M4>M3
The Gale Shapley Algorithm now yields the arrangement given by:
W2–M1, W3–M2, W4–M4, W1–M3
Note now, that as compared to the previous arrangement, M4 is now married to W4 as opposed to W2. Since W4 is higher on his ‘true’ preference list, he 
has achieved a more favourable result by giving a different rating list!
The reason that our algorithm is still viable in the real world, despite the large number of miscreants trying to find loopholes in the system, is that the volume 
of information required to foresee the possibilities, and to find a way around it is enormous! Consider the High School application system mentioned 
earlier. For an applicant to subvert the system, they need to know the preference list of the applicants and (potentially) that of the schools as well. Roth and 
Rothblum proved that provided the information available to applicants is sufficiently limited, he or she cannot gain by submitting a list which reverses the 
true ordering of two schools (as M4 did earlier).
In non-cooperative game theory, such a situation (one in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no 
player has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy unilaterally) is known as Nash Equilibrium. 
